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Tolling	 bells	 for	 Nationally	 Appropriate	 Mitigation	
Actions	in	Emerging	Economies:	Policy	Cycle	Stages	in	
Comparative	Perspective		Prabhat	 Upadhyaya 1 , 2 , 	 Mathias	 Fridahl2,	 Björn-Ola	 Linnér2	 and	 Mikael	Román3	
1 Introduction		The	 2015	 Paris	 Agreement	 on	 climate	 change	 marks	 an	 important	 shift	 for	climate	 governance	 toward	 a	 renewed	 interest	 in	 state-centric	 comparisons.	First,	the	agreement	affirms	that	all	countries	are	expected	to	take	on	some	form	of	 mitigation	 actions.	 Second,	 through	 the	 Intended	 Nationally	 Determined	Contributions	(INDCs)4,	the	agreement	puts	the	states	back	as	the	vital	player	in	orchestrating	a	 climate	 regime.	Third,	 it	marks	 the	beginning	of	a	new	cycle	of	implementing	mitigation	measures.	Since	 international	 climate	 politics	 is	 increasingly	 driven	 by	 a	 multilateral	bottom-up	 perspective,	 Purdon	 (2015)	 argues	 that	we	 need	 greater	 clarity	 on	national	 and	 subnational	 climate	 politics:	 neoliberal	 institutionalism,	International	Relations	scholars	and	climate	policy	practitioners	“tend	to	expect	global	 climate	 accords	 and	 international	 institutions	 to	 produce	 uniform	 and	standardized	 effects	 at	 the	domestic	 level”	while	 in	 fact	 “state	 and	 subnational	interests	 on	 climate	 change	 are	 much	 more	 varied”	 (Purdon,	 2015,	 p.	 4).	 In	anticipation	 of	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 focus	 of	 academic	 research	 from	 climate	 policy	negotiations	and	formation	to	decision-making	and	implementation,	it	is	time	to	open	up	the	“black	box”	of	national	policy	priorities	and	intentions	(Victor	2011:	8),	 to	 bring	 under	 focus	 the	 variations	 in	 states’	 climate	 policy	 responses	 to	internationally	 conceptualized	 instruments (Purdon,	 2015;	 Steinberg	 &	Vandeveer,	2012).		The	overarching	objective	of	this	paper	is	to	shed	light	on	how	countries	engage	domestically	with	the	internationally	formulated	climate	policy	frameworks.	The	national	circumstances	approach,	crowned	by	the	INDCs	process,	began	with	the	Nationally	 Appropriate	 Mitigation	 Actions	 (NAMAs)	 in	 2007	 at	 the	 13th	Conference	 of	 Parties	 to	 the	 UN	 Framework	 Convention	 on	 Climate	 Change																																																									1	Corresponding	author:	Prabhat.upadhyaya@liu.se.	The	authors	would	like	to	thank	the	Swedish	Energy	Agency	for	supporting	this	pwork	through	the	grant	P35462-2.	2	Centre	 for	 Climate	 Science	 and	 Policy	 Research	 (CSPR),	 Department	 of	 Thematic	 Studies	 –	Environmental	Change,	Linköping	University,	Linköping,	Sweden.	3	Swedish	Agency	for	Growth	Policy	Analysis,	Swedish	Embassy,	Brazil	4	We	 refer	 to	 the	 submission	 made	 by	 countries	 to	 the	 UNFCCC	 in	 preparation	 for	 the	 Paris	Agreement	 as	 INDCs.	 These	 may	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 different	 from	 the	 Nationally	 Determined	Contributions	(NDCs)	that	will	be	confirmed	by	countries	in	conjunction	with	their	submission	of	instruments	of	ratification.	
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(UNFCCC).	 As	 a	 policy	 instrument	 aimed	 to	 incentivize	 mitigation	 action	 in	developing	 countries,	 by	 registering	 and	 recognising	 nationally	 defined	contributions	 to	 the	 convention,	 NAMAs	 can	 provide	 important	 insights	 for	addressing	the	challenges	facing	the	development	of	the	INDCs.	NAMA	 portended	 a	 facilitative,	 bottom-up	 turn	 of	 international	 climate	multilateralism	 (Bodansky	 &	 Diringer,	 2014;	 Coetzee	 &	 Winkler,	 2014).	 By	shifting	 the	 locus	of	 action	at	national	 levels,	NAMAs	are	 turning	out	 to	be	 the	precursor	 for	 INDCs.	Therefore,	even	though	there	are	differences	between	the	two	instruments,	an	analysis	of	NAMA	engagements	can	serve	a	useful	purpose	for	 the	 NDC	 implementation.	 NAMA	 offers	 a	 test	 bed	 for	 the	 challenges	 when	international	 climate	 policy	 instrument	 encounters	 varied	 national	 policy	realties.	The	paper	 throws	 light	on	 the	similarities	and	challenges	 faced	 in	realising	 the	internationally	 formulated	 policy	 framework	 of	 NAMA	 in	 different	 country	settings	 and	 draws	 tentative	 lessons	 for	 future	 policy	 frameworks.	 To	 do	 so	policy	cycle	model	 is	used	 to	operationalize	 the	analysis	of	NAMA	engagement.	Although	it	 is	a	simplification	of	an	 integrative	policy	process,	 the	categories	of	agenda	setting,	policy	formulation,	decision-making,	implementation,	evaluation	and	innovation	help	us	to	point	at	differences	and	similarities	between	countries’	engagement	with	NAMAs	 (Jann	&	Wegrich,	2007).	We	point	 at	 context	 specific	elements	 that	 help	 us	 to	 understand	 the	 NAMA	 engagement	 in	 the	 different	policy	 contexts.	Conversely,	 policy	 cycle	 analysis	 also	helps	us	 to	 approach	 the	varied	contexts	in	which	NAMAs	play	out.	The	 paper	 aims	 to	 highlight	 the	 nuances	 and	 complexities	 that	 countries	 face	when	 engaging	 with	 international	 policy	 frameworks	 in	 their	 domestic	constituencies.	 We	 do	 so	 by	 studying	 the	 reception	 of	 and	 engagement	 with	NAMAs	 in	 the	 three	major	 emerging	 economies:	 India,	 Brazil	 and	 South	Africa	(henceforth	referred	to	as	IBSA).	All	three	countries	have	been	key	actors	in	the	negotiations	on	developing	country’s	obligation	post	Kyoto.	They	agreed	 in	 the	so	called	IBSA	trilateral	dialogue	forum	2003	to	develop	common	strategies	and	position	through	multilateral	diplomacy	(IBSA,	2003),	 later	specified	to	 include	UNFCCC	 negotiations	 (IBSA,	 2008).	 Also,	 with	 increase	 in	 their	 gross	 national	income	 in	 recent	 years,	 their	 emissions	have	 also	 increased,	which	 in	 turn	has	resulted	 in	 increased	 international	 expectations	 for	 them	 to	 take	on	mitigation	actions	domestically.	 By	studying	the	NAMA	engagement,	we	address the following research questions:		 1. How	 do	 the	 IBSA’s	 engagement	 with	 NAMAs	 play	 out	 with	 respect	 to	policy	cycle	categories?	2. Do	the	IBSA’s	engagement	with	NAMAs	differ	or	converge	with	respect	to	the	six	analytical	policy	cycle	categories?	The	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 Section	 two	 outlines	 the	 background	 to	NAMAs	and	contextualises	the	three	case	countries	and	briefly	 introduces	their	national	 initiatives	 to	 tackle	 climate	 change.	 Section	 three	 elaborates	 on	 the	theoretical	 and	 analytical	 framework	 by	 elaborating	 on	 policy	 processes	 and	
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Comparative	 Environmental	 Politics;	 and	 the	 methodology	 employed	 for	 data	collection	 and	 analysis.	 Section	 four	 presents	 the	 results	 on	 the	 NAMA	engagement	in	the	case	countries	on	individual	basis.	Section	five	discusses	the	findings	 from	 policy	 cycle	 perspective	 in	 comparative	 but	 stage-wise	 manner.	Section	Six	concludes	the	paper	by	summarizing	the	countries’	engagement	with	NAMAs	and	tentatively	enumerates	the	lessons	for	NDC	implementation.	
2 Background		Domestic	 climate	 policies	 and	 plans	 are	 being	 innovated	 at	 national	 level	 at	different	rates	and	times	in	different	world	regions		(Dubash,	Hagemann,	Höhne,	&	 Upadhyaya,	 2013;	 Jordan	 &	 Huitema,	 2014b,	 p.	 388).	 Recent	 years	 have	witnessed	growing	attention	to	environmental	policy	making	in	the	global	South	(Bailey	&	 Compston,	 2012;	 But	 see	Held,	 Roger,	 &	Nag,	 2013).	 By	 focusing	 on	NAMA	 engagement	 in	 three	 emerging	 economies	 from	 a	 policy	 process	perspective,	this	paper	contributes	to	these	efforts.	The	 peer-reviewed	 literature	 explicitly	 addressing	 NAMAs	 is	 primarily	qualitative	and	driven	by	case	studies	(Winkler,	2014)5.	Some	sector	case	studies	focusing	 on	 the	 tourist	 (Burns	 &	 Vishan,	 2010),	 waste	 (Guzzone,	 2013),	 and	energy	 demand	 sectors	 (Bassi,	 Deenapanray,	 &	 Davidsen,	 2013)	 cut	 across	countries.	These	studies	are	complemented	by	studies	 focusing	on	 institutional	aspects	 of	 the	 international	 framework	 such	 as	 complexity	 in	 accessing	NAMA	support	 (Shrivastava	 &	 Upadhyaya,	 2014);	 effectuating	 matching	 of	 NAMA	proposals	with	support	(Fridahl,	Upadhyaya,	&	Linnér,	2014;	Winkler	&	Dubash,	2015);	 and	 studying	 the	 evolution	of	NAMAs	as	 a	 concept	 (Coetzee	&	Winkler,	2014).	Studies	have	also	taken	comparative	approaches	to	study	NAMAs	across	countries	 and	 types	 of	 actors	 engaged	 (Garibaldi	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Tyler,	 Boyd,	Coetzee,	 Torres	 Gunfaus,	 &	 Winkler,	 2013;	 Shrivastava	 &	 Upadhyaya,	 2014;	Fridahl,	 Hagemann,	 Röser,	 &	 Amars,	 2015).	 This	 paper	 complements	 these	efforts	 by	 comparing	 NAMA	 engagement	 in	 three	 emerging	 economies:	 India,	Brazil	and	South	Africa.	
2.1 Contextualising	IBSA	Our	 three	case	countries	have	varied	as	well	as	overlapping	socio-political	and	techno-economic	 preconditions,	 yet	 they	 have	 cooperated	 amongst	 others,	through	the	IBSA	trilateral	–	a	formal	forum	among	these	three	democracies	on	issues	 of	 common	 concern,	 including	 climate	 change.	 The	 IBSA	 trilateral	 was	formed	 in	2003	 to	help	 counter	 the	marginalization	of	developing	 countries	 in	multilateral	 fora.	While	 these	 countries	 agreed,	 in	 the	 IBSA	 trilateral	 dialogue	forum,	 to	 develop	 common	 strategies	 and	 position	 in	multilateral	 negotiations	little	is	known	of	how	they	have	engaged	with	the	concept	of	NAMAs	within	their	domestic	 constituencies,	 which	 all	 of	 the	 three	 countries	 were	 active	 in	establishing.	Thus	IBSA	present	a	selection	of	case	countries	 that	engaged	with																																																									5	For	more	details	see	Volume	6,	Supplement	1,	2014	of	Climate	and	Development.	Special	Issue:	Designing	 and	 implementing	 mitigation	 actions:	 emerging	 lessons	 from	 five	 developing	countries.	
	 4	
each	other	to	fine-tune	positions	and	strategies	to	negotiate	at	the	international	fora	 but	 domestically	 have	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 NAMA	 concept	 in	 very	 varied	socio-political	circumstances.		
2.1.1 Climate	Policy	in	IBSA	countries	From	a	climate	policy	perspective,	the	energy	profile	and	energy	access	in	Brazil	is	 drastically	 different	 from	 South	 Africa	 and	 India;	 similarly,	 India	 has	 a	 very	high	 population	 that	 accounts	 for	 very	 low	 electricity	 power	 consumption	 per	capita	 –	 a	pattern	 followed	 in	 its	GHG	emissions	 also.	 In	 contrast,	 South	Africa	has	relatively	low	emissions	from	agriculture	sector	but	its	per	capita	emissions	are	much	higher.	Nonetheless,	all	 three	acknowledged	the	 importance	to	tackle	climate	 change	 by	 developing	 national	 legislation	 –	 Law	 12187/2009,	 which	establishes	the	National	Policy	on	Climate	Change	for	Brazil	–	or	national	policy	on	climate	change	–	the	National	Action	Plan	on	Climate	Change	(NAPCC),	2008	for	 India	and	National	Climate	Change	Response	White	Paper	(NCCRWP),	2011	for	 South	 Africa.	 Although	 these	 national	 initiatives	 are	 cognizant	 of	 country’s	pre-existing	 priorities	 –promoting	 “development	 objectives	while	 also	 yielding	co-benefits	 for	 addressing	 climate	 change”	 in	 India	 (GoI,	 2008,	 p.	 2);	 “making	social-economic	 development	 compatible	 with	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 climate	system”	(Government	of	Brazil,	2009);	and	“integrate	mitigation	and	adaptation	elements	within	developmental	 framework”	 in	 South	Africa	 (Republic	 of	 South	Africa,	 2011,	 p.	 13);	 –	 they	 do	 not	 shy	 away	 from	 identifying	 avenues	 for	mitigation.	 For	 India	 this	 translates	 into	 eight	 national	 missions,	 with	 at	 least	four	of	the	missions	providing	co-benefits	of	mitigation.	South	Africa	presents	its	initiatives	 as	 eight	 flagships,	 all	 of	 which	 with	 exception	 of	 one	 relate	 to	mitigation.	Similarly,	Brazil	presents	seven	goals	of	which	the	main	focus	resides	on	different	forms	of	land-use,	mainly	forest	issues	and	agriculture.	In	addition,	all	 three	 countries	 are	 also	 witnessing	 movement	 on	 climate	 policy	 at	 sub-national	level	(Romeiro	&	Parente,	2011;	Tyler,	2013;	Dubash	&	Jogesh,	2014).		
2.2 NAMAs	in	the	INDCs	In	2010,	it	was	agreed	that	NAMAs	should	be	undertaken	“aimed	at	achieving	a	deviation	 in	 emissions	 relative	 to	 ‘business	 as	 usual’	 emissions	 in	 2020”	(UNFCCC,	 2011b).	 This	 provided	 a	 timeframe	 for	 NAMAs,	 without	 preventing	them	 from	 playing	 a	 role	 beyond	 2020.	 As	 evidenced	 in	 the	 proposals	 to	 the	NAMA	registry	as	well	as	NAMA	references	in	some	of	the	draft	NDCs,	developing	countries	seek	to	engage	with	NAMAs	in	both	pre-	and	post-2020	context.	By	end	of	 2015,	 94%	 of	 developing	 countries	 had	 submitted	 their	 INDCs	 (Cameron & 
Harms, 2015).	Many	of	 these	are	conditional	on	 international	support.	One-third	of	 developing	 countries	 refer	 to	 NAMAs	 in	 their	 INDCs,	 with	 references	correlating	 with	 income	 –	 over	 43%	 of	 low-income	 developing	 countries	communicate	a	role	for	NAMAs	in	their	INDCs	compared	to	22%	of	high-income	developing	countries	(Figure	1).	At	the	same	time,	over	100	so-called	NAMAs	by	developing	 countries	 have	 been	 officially	 submitted	 to	 the	 UNFCCC’s	 NAMA-Registry,	seeking	variety	of	international	support	(UNFCCC,	2016).		
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Figure	 1	 |	 References	 to	 NAMAs	 in	 developing	 countries’	 submissions	 of	intended	NDCs	by	income	category.	
 
3 Theoretical	 and	 Analytical	 Framework:	 Policy	 Processes	 and	
Comparative	Environmental	Politics		
3.1 A	 staged	 approach	 to	 policy	 processes:	 Applying	 the	 “policy	 cycle”	
analysis/model		Policy	 processes	 can	 be	 understood	 from	 a	 multitude	 of	 perspectives.	 We	approach	 policy	 processes	 and	 policy	 making	 through	 the	 policy	 cycle	 model.	This	model	depicts	policy	making	as	a	process	with	six	overlapping	stages.	First,	the	 agenda-setting	 stage	 where	 the	 governments	 and	 political	 actors	 initially	frame	 the	 problems;	 second,	policy	formulation	 stage	where	 policy	 options	 are	formulated	 within	 government;	 third	 decision-making	 where	 government	decides	to	undertake	a	particular	course	of	action;	fourth	policy	implementation	stage	which	refers	to	actual	governmental	efforts	to	put	policies	into	action;	fifth,	
evaluation	of	impacts	of	implementing	policy,	both	direct	and	indirect,	and;	sixth,	
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Figure	2	|	The	policy	cycle	model	
	 		It	is	widely	acknowledged	that	the	policy	cycle	model	is	a	simplified	framework	to	 understand	 policy	 processes	 (Jann	 &	 Wegrich,	 2007).	 The	 critique	 mainly	focuses	 on	 understanding	 policy	 processes	 as	 developing	 in	 discrete	 and	sequential	 stages.	 A	 second	 line	 of	 critique	 argues	 that	 the	 policy	 cycle	model	does	 not	 offer	 any	 explanation	 of	 what	 drives	 processes	 from	 one	 stage	 to	another.	However,	 the	critique	under-emphasises	 the	 important	and	successful	usages	of	the	model:	 it	has	been	frequently	applied	both	as	“a	yardstick	for	the	evaluation	of	the	(comparative)	success	or	failure	of	a	policy”	(Jann	&	Wegrich,	2007,	p.	58)	and	 for	contextualising	case	studies	of	 single	steps	 in	 the	process.	Based	on	 this	 critique,	 rather	 than	 seeing	 the	policy	 cycle	model	 as	 a	 accurate	representation	 and	 causal	 model	 of	 policy	 processes,	 we	 use	 it	 as	 a	 heuristic	devise	for	analytical	categorization	of	empirical	material.	
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3.3 Data	collection	and	coding	For	 our	 analysis,	we	 rely	 on	 semi-structured	 interviews	 of	 key	 actors	 in	 IBSA.	Secondary	 literature,	namely	policy	documents	 from	key	ministries	 involved	 in	the	 respective	 NAMA	 processes,	 the	 countries’	 submissions	 to	 the	 UNFCCC	 on	NAMAs	 and	 the	 research	 literature	 produced	 in	 these	 countries	 provide	 the	contextual	background	within	which	this	study	is	undertaken.		Document	analysis	formed	the	basis	for	developing	a	semi-structured	interview	guide	 that	 was	 deployed	 between	 May	 2014	 and	 March	 2016	 in	 the	 case	countries	 for	collecting	 the	data.	A	 total	of	41	 interviews	(19	South	African,	15	Indian	and	7	Brazilian)	were	conducted	during	 this	 time	period.	Depending	on	availability	 of	 personal	 resources,	 South	 African	 interviews	were	 conducted	 in	2014,	Indian	interviews	in	2015	and	Brazilian	interviews	in	2015-16.	We	found	it	 preferable	 that	 all	 interviews	 were	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 same	 person.	 Time	constraints	only	allowed	for	in	situ	studies	in	two	countries.	While	the	number	of	Brazilian	 interviews	 is	 also	 significantly	 fewer	 than	 the	 other	 two	 countries	interviewees,	 we	 found	 the	 Brazilian	 data	 to	 be	 sufficiently	 solid	 for	 applying	comparative	approach.		Non-state	 actors	 have	 become	 increasingly	 involved	 in	 both	 transnational	 and	domestic	climate	policy-making	over	the	last	decade	(Bäckstrand	et	al	2016,	fc).	Therefore,	the	interviewees	were	selected	to	represent	a	wide	range	of	actors	at	different	 levels	 of	 policy-making	 and	 policy-related	 activities	 representing	different	 constituencies.	 The	 interviewees	were	 encouraged	 to	 reflect	 not	 only	on	NAMAs	and	climate	policy	processes	in	specific,	but	climate	policy	in	general	and	 the	 role	of	 the	 international	 as	well	 as	domestic	 climate	policy	 integration	into	 other	 issue	 areas,	 particularly	 development.	 The	 interviews	 were	transcribed	 verbatim,	 summarized	 and	 coded	 using	 the	 software	NVivo	 as	 per	the	 stages	 of	 policy	 cycles,	 based	 on	 the	 framework	 provided	 in	 Table	 1.	 The	material	 thus	 generated	 was	 then	 analysed	 to	 identify	 differences	 and	similarities	in	NAMA	engagements.			
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Table	1	 |	 Policy	 cycle	 and	applicability	 to	NAMAs	 in	 IBSA,	based	on	Wellstead	and	Stedman	(2015,	p.	57).	
Policy	cycle	stages	 Examples	of	policy	roles	and	tasks	Agenda	setting	 Identifying	policy	issues	Identifying	policy	options	Environmental	scans	Consulting	with	the	public	Policy-formulation	 Appraising	policy	options	Collecting	policy-related	data,	information	and	research	Negotiating	with	stakeholders	Preparing	position	papers	Decision	making	 Comparing	policy	options	Decision	matrices	High-level	briefing	Negotiating	with	central	agencies	Department	planning	Implementation	 Implementing	or	delivering	policies	or	programs	Negotiating	with	program	managers	Consulting	with	stakeholders	Legal	analysis	Evaluation	 Policy	evaluation	skills	Risk-based	tools	and	techniques	Evidence-based	policy	Policy	innovation	 Adaptive	learning	Terminating	or	updating	existing	policy	
4 Results:	Views	on	NAMA	engagement	in	IBSA		By	 using	 the	 heuristic	 devise	 provided	 by	 the	 policy	 cycle	 model,	 this	 paper	compares	the	policy	process	surrounding	NAMA	engagement	in	IBSA.		Entry	 point	 for	 our	 analysis	 is	 post	 15th	 Conference	 of	 the	Parties	 (COP-15)	 in	late	 2009.	 The	 COP	had	 taken	note	 of	 the	 Copenhagen	Accord	 and	 following	 a	UNFCCC	decision	at	in	COP-15,	countries	were	submitting	information	regarding	their	 mitigation	 efforts	 under	 the	 so-called	 Copenhagen	 Pledges	 to	 the	Copenhagen	 Accord.	 The	 Cancún	 Agreements,	 subsequently	 adopted	 in	December	 2010,	 served	 to	 bring	 elements	 of	 the	 Copenhagen	 Accord	 into	 the	formal	negotiating	process	and	made	it	acceptable	to	all	Parties.	
4.1 India	While	 India’s	 submission	 to	 the	 Copenhagen	 Accord	 specify	 that	 “India	 will	endeavour	 to	 reduce	 the	 emission	 intensity	 of	 its	 GDP	 by	 20-25%	 by	 2020	 in	comparison	to	the	2005	level”	(UNFCCC,	2011a),	it	did	not	use	the	NAMA	phrase	per	 se.	 Although	 many	 of	 the	 Indian	 informants	 do	 not	 view	 the	 Indian	Copenhagen	Pledge	as	a	NAMA	(IN-10,	13,	15),	there	are	contending	voices	too.	
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As	 informant	 07	 recalls,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 submitting	 the	 pledge,	 “for	many	 of	 us	including	I	thought	they	are	NAMAs”	(IN-07).		
4.1.1 Agenda	setting,	policy	formulation	and	decision	making	According	to	most	informants,	NAMAs	did	indeed	emerge	on	the	Indian	political	agendas,	but	with	a	strong	connection	to	the	scale	and	nature	of	the	international	support.	 “The	government	was	open	 to	 ideas	of	NAMAs	but	not	actually	 trying	out	any	NAMAs	or	encouraging	NAMA	research	in	India.	[…]	India	was	following	a	very	 strict	definition	of	NAMAs,	 […]	only	 those	mitigation	projects	which	are	supported	by	new	and	additional	international	finance,	technology	transfer	and	capacity	building	support	are	NAMAs”	 (IN–04).	This	 is	 confirmed	by	 informant	12:	“India’s	position	on	NAMAs	has	been	[…]	mixed	or	complicated.	I	don’t	think	they	were	 really	 ever	 in	 favour	 of	 doing	 NAMAs,	 it	 had	 to	 do	 linked	with	 the	MRV.”	This	understanding	constricted	NAMA	usage	to	the	agenda	setting	stage.	While	 formally	 the	usage	 of	NAMA	 terminology	mostly	 got	 confined	 to	 agenda	setting	stage,	 it	 is	understood	 that	all	mitigation	actions	with	no	negative	side-effects	for	development	could	be	seen	as	NAMAs	(IN–04).	This	opens	the	door	to	approach	India’s	national	missions	under	the	NAPCC	as	NAMAs.	A	key	decision	maker	emphasizes	that:	“…it	would	be	improper	to	treat	NAMAs	different	from	the	 national	 missions.	 National	 missions	 are	 also	 nationally	 appropriate	mitigation	actions…”	 (IN–03).	On	 the	 same	 lines	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 “if	 the	NAMA	[…]	supports	the	renewable	mission,	[…]	the	[Perform,	Achieve	and	Trade]	PAT	scheme,	so	on	that’s	fine”	(IN-10).	Supporting	existing	policy	options	is	identified	as	 a	 possible	 way	 forward	 for	 NAMAs	 but	 that	 decision	 is	 solely	 seen	 as	Government’s	prerogative.	But	what	led	to	relegation	of	NAMAs	to	the	fringes?	Informant	4	provides	some	clues:	“there	is	a	politics	associated	with	NAMAs,	which	is	by	and	large	focusing	on	MRV.	[…]”	As	will	become	evident	in	the	evaluation	stage,	the	politics	of	MRV	influenced	decision	making	on	NAMAs	in	India.	MRV	is	closely	linked	to	support	aspect:	“if	two	[finance	and	technology]	are	tangible	upfront	before	you	then	you	can	 agree	 to	 other	 conditions	 like	MRV	 […].	 But	 in	 NAMA	 both	 were	missing.	Finance	was	missing	and	technology	was	missing.	[…]	What	else	is	there	if	these	two	 things	 are	 not	 there?	Why	 should	 anybody	 come	with	 program?”	 (IN-15).	Others	 contend	 that	 “…the	 overall	 structure	 for	NAMAs	 has	 never	 become	 too	clear.	That’s	number	one,	number	two,	the	availability	of	the	scales	of	financing	that	a	country	like	India	needs	–	[…]	were	never	made	available”	(IN-07).	These	concerns	at	decision-making	stage	concretized	the	template	within	which	NAMA	got	stuck.	
4.1.2 Implementation,	evaluation	and	policy	innovation	In	 line	 with	 the	 views	 held	 on	 NAMAs,	 their	 implementation	 is	 either	 not	occurring	 or	 is	 constantly	 implemented	 in	 myriad	 ways.	 First,	 if	 there	 are	 no	specific	NAMA,	it	is	not	surprising	that	stakeholders	are	“not	seeing	anything	on	the	ground	so	far”	(IN-11).	Second,	 if	all	development	driven	mitigation	actions	are	regarded	as	NAMAs,	it	is	constantly	implemented	in	a	multitude	of	actions	–	primarily	as	national	missions	under	the	NAPCC	–	without	them	being	referred	
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to	as	NAMAs.	The	reason	why	NAMAs	as	a	label	was	not	taken	up	formally	is	also	institutional	 in	 nature.	 “…Its	 partly	 because	 they	 came	 up	 with	 this	 idea	 of	missions	and	then	there	was	not	sort	of	some	equivalence	made	between	NAMAs	and	missions.	 […]	 you’ve	 people	 from	 the	MEA,	 […]	 doing	 the	 negotiations	 or	even	 MoEF.	 Whereas	 NAMAs	 are	 really	 the	 line	 ministries	 functions,	 energy,	transport	etc.	[…]	So	the	people	who	might	be	generators	of	NAMAs	are	not	the	people	who	are	in	negotiations.	And	there	is	no	mechanism	to	link	those.	[…]	the	other	guys	don’t	particularly	want	to	come	to	the	table”	(IN-13).	Inability	to	get	the	implementing	departments	directly	involved	hampers	NAMA	engagement.	Accordingly,	 evaluation	 has	 not	 been	 an	 issue	 since	 the	 perspective	 in	 India,	expressed	by	the	informants,	is	either,	if	ever	there	was	an	Indian	NAMA,	it	is	no	longer	a	NAMA	and	do	not	have	to	meet	international	MRV	requirements,	or	that	if	 NAMAs	 are	 seen	 as	 development	 driven	 mitigation	 action,	 then	 they	 are	undertaken	 solely	 by	 domestic	 support	 and	 consequently	 do	 not	 require	international	 MRV.	 Indian	 Government	 is	 neither	 keen	 to	 call	 the	 unilaterally	initiated	mitigation	actions	as	NAMAs	for	recognition	purposes	nor	do	they	see	any	 justification	 in	 opening	 the	 unilateral	 actions	 to	 international	 MRV.	 The	political	position	was	that	“as	 long	as	there	is	no	international	support,	we	will	not	call,	what	we	are	doing	as	NAMAs.	So	we	would	not	report	or	we	would	not	subject	ourselves	to	scrutiny”	(IN-04).	MRV,	as	well	as	International	Consultation	and	 Analysis	 (ICA)	 requirements,	 are	 clearly	 seen	 as	 barriers	 to	 engagement.	Respondents	 are	 sceptic	 of	 such	 initiatives	 as	 a	 means	 to	 “second-guess	 their	policies	[…]	and	impose	certain	policies”	(IN-10).	This	line	of	argument	could	be	addressed	if	support	for	implementing	NAMAs	is	provided.	But	in	such	cases,	the	scale	of	support	provided	and	“issues	of	sovereignty	come	up"	(IN-04).	Opening	oneself	for	MRV	or	ICA	“without	significant	international	support”	(IN-10)	does	not	seem	worthwhile.		If	NAMAs	ever	 fulfilled	 the	purpose	of	specifying	 targets,	 this	purpose	has	now	been	overtaken	by	 INDCs.	 In	 that	sense,	NAMAs	did	pave	way	 to	 innovate	new	policy	at	conceptual	level	by	enhancing	engagement	with	“definitional	problems	or	 political	 questions”	 (IN-04)	 and	 at	 implementation	 level	 by	 providing	“opportunity	 to	push	 things	at	 a	programmatic	 level”	 (IN-07).	As	 expressed	by	informant	1	in	connection	to	the	Indian	Copenhagen	Pledge:	“at	that	time	[2009]	it	 […]	was	a	NAMA	probably.	Now	 it	would	be	probably	 the	 INDC.	 Its	all	about	word	 changing	 things,	 game	 basically	 going	 on.”	 (IN–01).	 Similarly:	 “to	 me	 it	seems	like	the	flavour	of	 the	month	kind	of	syndrome	where,	 to	me	an	INDC	is	just	a	NAMA	under	another	name”	(IN–12).	As	we	shall	see,	it	seems	like	the	door	to	maintain	 and	 apply	 the	 terminology	 “NAMAs”	 also	 for	 post-2020	 actions	 is	open.	It	all	depends	on	them	becoming	a	“bridge	to	INDCs”	(IN-13)	and	ensuring	support.	Without	assured	support	at	the	scale	needed,	India	does	not	see	value	in	committing	to	any	international	framing.		
4.2 Brazil	In	 Brazil,	 things	 took	 a	 considerably	 different	 turn.	 Both	 the	 Brazilian	Copenhagen	 Pledge	 and	 its	 constituent	 NAMAs,	 were	 already	 from	 the	 outset	intimately	linked	to	the	country’s	new	Climate	Change	Law,	developed	in	parallel	with	 the	 global	 negotiations,	 which	 specified	 sectoral	 actions	 that,	 combined,	
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amount	 to	 reductions	 in	 the	 range	 of	 36.1–38.9	 per	 cent	 below	BAU	 for	 2020.	Same	 numbers	 are	 used	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 Copenhagen	 Pledge	 as	 well	 as	 the	subsequent	 NAMAs	 (Government of Brazil, 2010; UNFCCC, 2011a).	 To	 informant	five	 the	 situation	 is	 clear:	 “the	 Copenhagen	 Pledges	 are	 NAMAs”	 (BR–05).	Informant	six	nuances	the	position	by	stressing	that	the	reduction	figures	itself	is	“not	a	NAMA,	it’s	actually	a	target”	(BR-06).	
4.2.1 Agenda	setting,	policy	formulation	and	decision	making		Brazil	was	one	of	 the	 first	developing	 countries	 that	 submitted	 information	on	NAMAs	to	the	UNFCCC.	On	29	December	2015	–	a	few	days	after	end	of	COP15	–	the	 Brazilian	 National	 Climate	 Change	 Law	 was	 established.	 Submitting	information	on	the	Brazilian	NAMAs	exactly	one	month	 later,	29	 January	2010,	constitutes	a	remarkably	expedite	policy	process,	making	NAMAs	centrepiece	of	national	government’s	climate	policy.		This	 development	 started	 already	 in	 2007,	 when	 the	 Brazilian	 government	established	 an	 Interministerial	 Committee	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (CIM)	 that,	 in	collaboration	with	 societal	 stakeholders,	 was	 given	 the	 task	 to	 develop	 a	 new	climate	 change	 legislation,	 that	would	harmonize	 climate	policy	across	 sectors,	issue	areas	and	ministries	(Government	of	Brazil,	2007).	This	meant	that,	when	the	call	 for	submitting	NAMAs	to	the	UNFCCC	emerged	 in	mid	December	2009,	Brazil	 had	 already	 well	 established	 discussions	 regarding	 national	 climate	change	policy,	based	on	the	account	of	a	“coalition	of	forces	that	was	created	in	second	semester	[around	July	2009]	and	the	assertiveness	of	the	[then]	minister	of	environment”	 (BR-04).	Thus,	with	 the	agenda	already	set	and	policy	options	identified	 and	 formulated,	 the	 terminology	 of	 the	 emerging	 national	 climate	change	 legislation	could	easily	be	adjusted	 to	 fit	 the	 international	 framing.	The	decision	 to	 submit	 information	 on	 the	 Brazilian	 NAMAs	 to	 the	 UNFCCC	 was	therefore	relatively	simple	and	expedite.	As,	informant	four	notes:	“the	Brazilian	NAMA	 was	 the	 climate	 change	 law”	 (BR–04).	 Conversely,	 the	 international	process	 on	NAMAs	 influenced	 the	 design	 of	 the	 new	Brazilian	 law.	 The	 law	 in	effect	 explicitly	 refers	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 using	 NAMAs	 to	 implement	 climate	targets	in	various	sectors	(Government	of	Brazil,	2009).	In	effect,	 the	discussions	on	NAMAs	 thereby	met	 little	 resistance	 in	 the	agenda	setting,	 policy	 formulation	 and	 decision	 making	 stages.	 Instead,	 further	engagement	 with	 NAMAs	 was	 well	 aligned	 with	 already	 on-going	 and	 highly	integrated	processes,	across	ministries	and	stakeholder	dialogues,	which	ended	up	 supporting	 the	 concept.	 But	 unlike	 India,	 why	 Brazil	 decided	 to	 label	 its	actions	 as	 NAMAs	without	 waiting	 for	 clarity	 on	 international	 support?	 There	seems	to	be	a	two	pronged	explanation	to	this.	Firstly,	as	part	of	its	international	diplomacy,	it	wanted	to	emphasize	its	sovereignty,	by	emphasizing	that	“it	can	do	whatever	 it	wants	because	 it	does	not	depend	on	anyone”	(BR-03).	The	second	part	of	the	puzzle	is	that	it	doesn’t	“see	NAMAs	as	action	to	get	support.	NAMA	is	our	commitment”	(BR-06).	This	reflects	its	eagerness	to	project	itself	as	a	strong	economy	which	could	 take	on	greater	responsibility	without	waiting	 for	others	to	act.	
	 12	
4.2.2 Implementation,	evaluation	and	policy	innovation	The	 situation,	 though,	 is	 decidedly	 different	 with	 respect	 to	 implementation,	where	assessments	range	from	“success”	to	“failure”.	“The	only	NAMA	that	Brazil	has	been	really	 implementing,	 significantly,	 is	 the	 reduction	of	deforestation	 in	the	Amazon.	The	other	NAMAs,	all	are	going	in	the	opposite	direction”	(BR–04).	The	 more	 intriguing	 question,	 though,	 is	 why	 there	 is	 a	 difference	 amongst	sectors	and	even	the	interpretation	of	the	success	rate	in	the	implementation	of	the	 Brazilian	 NAMAs.	 The	 steep	 reduction	 in	 emissions	 in	 Amazon	 region	 is	ascribed	to	two	interventions:	“law	enforcement	[…]	by	the	federal	police	against	deforestation,	 [using	good	monitoring	 system]	and	 the	 […]	more	effective,	was	the	denial	of	credits	by	public	banks	[…]	to	properties	with	illegal	deforestation”	(BR-01),	 the	 lack	of	progress	 in	other	NAMAs	 is	 largely	 attributed	 to	 “distance	between	what’s	on	paper	and	what	 is	really	being	 implemented”	(BR–01).	This	therefore	 calls	 for	 greater	 attention	 to	 understanding	 implementation	challenges.		Some	 informants’	 express	 concerns	 regarding	 existing	 methods	 for	 evaluating	progress.	Some	argue	 that	 the	Brazilian	methodologies	 for	measuring	emission	reductions	have	been	paltry.	“If	we	do	the	Brazilian	inventory	[…]	following	[…]	the	IPCC	rules,	then	the	AFOLU	sector	[agriculture,	forestry	and	other	land	use]	in	 Brazil,	 it	 actually	 sequestered	 and	 fixed	 the	 carbon,	 it	 doesn’t	 have	 any	emissions.”	 (BR–05).	 This	 perspective	 stems	 from	 a	 deep	 distrust	 for	 central	planning	 as	 it	 breeds	 corruption	 by	 providing	 central	 officials	 lot	 of	 power.	Although	levels	of	corruption	are	definitely	not	lower	at	local	level	(Timmons	&	Garfias,	 2015),	 this	 perspective	 sits	 uneasily	 with	 the	 “very	weak	 government	[…]	 and	 a	major	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 political	 system”	 (BR-04)	 at	 the	 current	moment.	In	terms	of	emissions	portfolio,	although	“comparatively,	Brazil	is	doing	ok”	 (BR-01)	 others	 contend	 that	 this	 has	 been	 achieved	 “without	 advancing	 in	low-carbon	 development”	 (BR-04).	 Thus	 “transparency	 and	 international	verification,	 [is]	 very	welcome”	 (BR–05).	 This	 complicates	 the	 picture	 because	NAMAs	 in	 Brazil	 are	 unilateral	 in	 nature	 and	 therefore	 the	 accuracy	 of	 the	numbers	may	be	hard	to	validate.	Yet,	at	same	time	most	agree	that	“NAMAs	are	not	anymore	at	debate	 in	Brazil	because	we	have	moved	 forward	 […]	when	we	move	 to	 the	 INDCs,	 the	NAMAs	per	se	makes	no	sense	anymore”	(BR–06),	and	that	“NAMAs	is	something	of	the	past”	 (BR-03).	The	 informants	agree	 that	 the	new	policy,	 in	 shape	of	 the	 INDC,	has	been	innovated	based	on	the	experience	with	NAMAs.	At	the	same	time,	the	law	from	2009	remains	the	main	vehicle	for	implementing	the	INDC	(including,	in	 turn,	 the	 possibility	 of	 using	 NAMAs	 as	 instrument	 to	 implement	 the	 law).	Unlike	 the	 submission	 on	 NAMAs,	 the	 INDC	 specifies,	 for	 example,	 a	 target	 of	minus	37	per	cent	in	2025	relative	to	the	base	year	2005	(Government	of	Brazil,	2015).	This	is	“an	absolute	target	in	relation	to	a	base	year.	And	it’s	an	economy-wide	 commitment.	 So	 its	 different	 from	 NAMAs	 …”	 (BR–07).	 Most	 informants	agree	that	the	INDCs,	designed	for	the	post-2020	period,	will	replace	the	function	served	by	NAMAs	in	the	pre-2020	period	but	that	the	former	will	be	innovated	based	 on	 the	 Brazilian	 experience	 with	 NAMAs.	 Yet,	 some	 urge	 for	 caution.	Informant	seven	argues,	for	example,	that	there	is	a	need	to	discuss	how	the	pre-2020	NAMAs	should	link	to	post-2020	actions.	Again,	part	of	the	answer	resides	
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in	the	national	climate	legislation	since	the	law	specifies	that	NAMAs	will	be	used	to	 implement	 sector	 targets	 and	 a	 low-carbon	 economy,	 the	 INDC	maintain	 an	option	for	future	engagement	with	NAMAs.	In	sum,	Brazil	had	no	concerns	using	international	framing	of	NAMAs.	
4.3 South	Africa	South	 African	 interviewees	 in	 general	 do	 not	 see	 their	 country’s	 Copenhagen	pledges	as	NAMAs.	South	Africa	indicated	that	it	“will	take	nationally	appropriate	mitigation	 action	 to	 enable	 a	 34%	 deviation	 below	 the	 ‘Business	 As	 Usual’	emissions	growth	 trajectory	by	2020	and	a	42%	deviation	below	the	 ‘Business	As	Usual’	emissions	growth	trajectory	by	2025”	(Republic	of	South	Africa,	2010).	The	 pledge	 was	 incumbent	 upon	 the	 support	 by	 developed	 countries	 but	 its	“overall	 pledge,	 did	 not	 have	 components	 in	 it”	 (SA-10).	 Although	 it	 is	acknowledged	 that	 “it	 definitely	 sets	 the	 scene	 for	 action	…	 so	 perhaps	 its	 not	necessary	to	regard	them	as	NAMAs	because	its	very	difficult	to	quantify	it	a	bit”	(SA-16).	The	usage	of	the	phrase	NAMA	is	also	attributed	to	confusion	on	part	of	the	country	regarding	NAMA.	
4.3.1 Agenda	setting,	policy	formulation	and	decision	making	While	making	submission	on	NAMA	registry,	South	Africa	referred	to	it	as	“a	core	element	 of	 any	 negotiating	 text”	 (UNFCCC,	 2009,	 p.	 97).	 It	 is	 however,	 worth	noting	that	neither	the	NCCRWP,	nor	the	report	on	mitigation	potential	in	South	Africa	make	 reference	 to	NAMA	 (DEA,	 2014a;	 Republic	 of	 South	Africa,	 2011).	The	site	for	action	in	the	NCCRWP	is	identified	as	flagships.	“It	is	primarily	from	flagships	 that	 …	 NAMAs”	 (SA-10)	 can	 come	 out	 but	 “they	 are	 not	 named	 as	NAMAs	because	there	isn’t	signal	from	the	international	level”	(SA-17).	However,	in	 its	Biennial	update	report,	South	Africa	presents	Vertically-Integrated	NAMA	(V-NAMA)	 as	 part	 of	 its	 Energy	 Efficiency	 and	 Energy	 Demand	 Management	Flagship	Programme	and	indicates	that	“the	final	V-NAMA	proposal	…	[would]	be	submitted	to	the	UNFCCC/NAMA	Facility	for	funding	and	support”	(DEA,	2014b,	p.	154).	While	 this	 indicates	 that	 the	DEA	 is	 trying	 to	align	 flagship	and	NAMA	initiatives,	 these	 efforts	 are	 seen	 as	 “being	 driven	 with	 great	 energy	 by	 a	marginal	department”	(SA-17),	thus	indicating	that	struggle	to	influence	agenda	is	driven	from	fringes.	Nonetheless,	concrete	initiatives	were	taken	to	package	various	domestic	actions	as	NAMAs.	Notable	among	these	are	the	Sustainable	Settlement	Facility	(SSF)	–	submitted	 to	 the	 NAMA	 Facility	 by	 SouthSouthNorth;	 the	 South	 African	Renewables	 Initiative	 (SARi)	 –	 an	 inter-ministerial	 initiative	 launched	 during	COP-17;	 currently	 ongoing	 V-NAMA	 that	 involves	 various	 departments	 of	 the	national	government;	but	also	transport	NAMA	as	well	as	Gautrain	NAMA.6	While	the	 fate	 meted	 out	 to	 each	 of	 these	 is	 different,	 these	 efforts	 do	 indicate	 that	NAMA	 as	 a	 policy	 instrument	 managed	 to	 reach	 the	 policy	 formulation	 stage.	Non-state	 actors	were	 also	 involved	 in	 these	NAMAs	 and	 “took	 direction	 from	what	South	Africa	was	saying	at	 international	 forums	(UNFCCC).	…	[but	also]	 it																																																									6	Our	analysis	is	based	on	detailed	analysis	of	SSF	and	SARI.		
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was	 in	 the	white	 paper	 so	 it	must	 be	 nationally	 appropriate”	 (SA-04).	 So	 both	international	 submissions	 as	 well	 as	 flagships	 within	 the	 NCCRWP	 became	reference	point	for	NAMA	development.	It	 is	 however	 at	 the	 decision	 making	 stage	 that	 the	 efforts	 to	 package	 these	actions	as	NAMAs	started	facing	resistance.	For	SSF,	"the	DEA	was	very	happy	to	sign	and	endorse	the	 letter”	but	the	efforts	 to	“show	enough	support	 from	the”	(SA-04)	relevant	 line	department	were	not	successful.	On	 the	other	hand,	SARI	managed	to	garner	international	support	but	it	“doesn’t	exist	on	ground	actually”	because	 “…the	 political	 and	 stakeholder	 management	 process	 […]	 was	 in	shambles”	 (SA-06);	 akin	 to	 “a	 political	 mess”	 (SA-14).	 Unlike	 SSF	 where	 the	problems	 were	 faced	 at	 both	 national	 and	 international	 level,	 in	 SARI	 “it	 was	more	 the	 issue	 around	 at	 domestic	 level,	 who	 has	 the	 mandate	 to	 lead	 on	renewable	 energy	 policy”	 (SA-15).	 Respondents	 also	 contend	 that	 SARI	 “didn’t	really	 get	 formulated	 into	 even	 a	 policy	 document”	 (SA-17).	 Lack	 of	 clarity	 on	who	 should	 be	 calling	 the	 shots	 seems	 to	 have	 resulted	 in	 the	 NAMA	 process	faltering	time	and	again.	
4.3.2 Implementation,	evaluation	and	policy	innovation	Translating	exemplary	policies	 into	action	seem	to	be	South	Africa’s	bane.	On	a	general	 level	 it	 affects	 the	 implementation	of	NAMAs	as	well	but	more	 specific	reasons	are	also	visible.	The	NCCRWP	established	a	coordination	committee	 in	the	form	of	Inter	Ministerial	Committee	on	Climate	Change	(IMCCC)	to	“oversee	all	 aspects	 of	 the	 implementation	of	 ...	White	Paper”	 (Republic	 of	 South	Africa,	2011,	p.	37).	There	 is	 confusion	on	 the	 role	of	 IMCCC,	which	 seems	 to	hamper	implementation.	 Some	 respondents	 think	 that	 its	 role	was	 limited	 “to	 facilitate	our	preparation	and	[…]	hosting	the	COP	…	ministerial	committee	seized	to	exist	after	COP-17”	(SA-18).	Others	are	“not	sure	where	it	is	right	now”	(SA-15).	It	is	possible	that	this	lack	of	clarity	on	the	role	of	IMCCC	influenced	coordination	and	implementation	of	NCCRWP	and	subsequently	NAMAs.		With	respect	to	evaluation,	MRV	in	itself	"is	not	a	concern”	(SA-06),	but	the	fact	that	 “someone	will	 be	 looking	 at	 you,	 […]	 that’s	 an	 impediment”	 (SA-02).	 The	country	prefers	to	use	its	 in	house	system	of	Monitoring	and	Evaluation	(M&E)	as	it	goes	beyond	the	“context	of	mitigation	only	and	GHG	…	[by	bringing]	in	the	context	of	adaptation”	(SA-10).		The	 country	 has	 a	 strong	 culture	 of	 policy	 innovation	 though.	 The	 country	 “is	fantastic	 in	designing	policy”	 (SA-06);	 and	 it	 is	 “far	better	 at	developing	policy	then	implementing	it”	(SA-08).	The	Long	Term	Mitigation	Scenario	exercise	and	the	South	African	proposal	on	Sustainable	Development	–	Policies	and	Measures	are	 evidence	 of	 innovative	 and	 capable	 epistemic	 climate	 community	 in	 the	country	(Upadhyaya,	2016).	Policy	innovation	is	also	seen	in	how	the	elements	of	SARI	 have	 been	 incorporated	 in	 designing	 a	 successful	 Renewable	 Energy	Programme	(REI4P)	and	efforts	of	National	Treasury	 to	roll	out	economy-wide	carbon	tax	in	2016.	
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5 Discussion:	 Comparing	 the	 Indian,	 Brazilian	 and	 South	 African	
NAMA	policy	processes	While	none	of	the	IBSA	countries	submitted	any	NAMA	to	the	NAMA	Registry	or	referred	 to	 NAMAs	 in	 their	 INDCs,	 a	 closer	 look	 presents	 a	 much	 more	complicated	 picture	 of	 NAMA	 engagement.	 In	 this	 section	 we	 comparatively	analyse	 the	NAMA	policy	 process	within	 broader	 climate	 policy	 process	 in	 the	case	 countries	using	 the	policy	 cycle	model.	 In	doing	 so	we	 intend	 to	highlight	the	similarities	and	differences	that	influenced	NAMA	engagement.	
5.1 Agenda	setting	The	chances	of	NAMAs	making	it	to	the	agenda	are	directly	proportional	to	the	importance	 given	 to	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	 climate	 change	 to	 the	 country	 under	study.	While	informants	across	the	board	acknowledged	that	climate	change	is	a	concern,	Brazil	gave	it	high	policy	priority,	particularly	between	2009-2010.	This	could	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 fact,	 that	 around	 the	 same	 time	 its	 Environment	Minister,	 Marina	 Silva	 resigned,	 shifted	 to	 Green	 Party	 and	 became	 its	Presidential	 candidate.	 Her	 presidential	 campaign,	 presence	 of	 pragmatic	environment	Minister	 in	Carlos	Minc	and	conducive	 international	 environment	around	COP15	provided	“reformist	forces”	in	Brazil	considerable	sway	(Viola	&	Franchini,	2014,	p.	683).	This	paved	way	 for	a	strong	Copenhagen	pledge	 from	Brazil	 leading	 to	 synergies	 between	 mitigation	 actions	 in	 Brazil	 and	 NAMAs	getting	 tapped.	 In	 addition,	 since	 2007,	 Brazil	 had	 clearly	 defined	 role	 and	responsibilities	 for	 institutions	 such	 as	 CIM	 and	 Executive	 Group	 on	 Climate	Change	 (GEx)	 (MCTI, 2014, pp. 8–9).	 This	 ensured	 that	 a	 wider	 consultation	process	 was	 in	 place	 that	 also	 paved	 way	 for	 having	 different	 government	departments	on	board.	Similar	to	Brazil,	the	consultation	process	led	by	DEA	in	South	Africa	is	lauded	for	its	multi-stakeholder,	consultative	and	iterative	nature	(Giordano,	Hall,	Gilder,	&	Parramon,	2011)	but	it	has	not	necessarily	translated	into	 implementation.	 In	 contrast,	 due	 to	 high	 population,	 it	 is	 felt	 that	undertaking	a	very	wide	consultative	process	can	be	counterproductive	in	India.		Before	 the	 current	 “crisis	 of	 governance”	 (BR-01,	 04)	 struck	 it,	 Brazil	 was	unilaterally	 taking	 successful	 efforts	 to	 reduce	 its	 GHG	 emissions,	 particularly	from	deforestation	 in	Amazon.	 In	 contrast,	 there	 is	 no	Green	Party	 in	 India	 or	South	Africa.	Neither	 is	 it	 “part	of	 the	electoral	 calculus	 for	any	politician”	 (IN-13),	 nor	 is	 it	 “a	 campaign	 issue”	 (SA-01).	 Part	 of	 the	 problem	 is	 that	 climate	change	 is	 an	 abstract,	 long	 term	 issue	 compared	 to	more	 urgent	 and	 pressing	challenges,	 particularly	 in	 case	 of	 India	 and	 South	Africa.	 In	 comparison	Brazil	has	a	high	rate	of	energy	access	driven	by	hydro	power	which	reduces	pressure	on	 it	 to	 take	 comparable	 transformation	efforts.	But	with	 the	 current	Brazilian	“crisis	 of	 governance.”	 climate	 issues	 may	 again	 take	 a	 back	 seat.	 How	 IBSA	engage	 with	 NAMAs	 then	 becomes	 a	 function	 of	 their	 immediate	 priorities.	Electoral	demands	managed	to	bring	climate	change	at	centre	stage	for	Brazil	in	2009-10	 but	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 given	 as	 much	 attention	 in	 IBSA	 now.	 If	environment	 is	 a	 priority	 for	 the	 country	 in	 general,	 then	 it	 will	 take	 policy	frameworks	 such	 as	 NAMAs	 as	 a	means	 to	 tackle	 climate	 change,	 if	 there	 are	
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other	 pressing	 priorities	 then	 other	 factors	 need	 to	 weigh	 in	 to	 make	international	framings	worthwhile	option.	
5.2 Policy	formulation	Depending	 upon	 the	 perceived	 utility	 of	NAMA	 in	 pursuing	 national	 priorities,	NAMA	 engagement	 at	 policy	 formulation	 stage	 varies	 in	 IBSA.	 Studies	 in	 India	consistently	approached	NAMA	as	a	mechanism	that	could	be	tapped	in	future	–	provided	 its	 concerns	 were	 addressed	 (ABPS	 Infra,	 2011;	 Jindal,	 Khanna,	 and	Sriram,	 2013).	While	 some	 studies	 rued	 the	 lack	 of	 clarity	 on	which	 of	 India’s	eight	 national	missions	 ‘can	 finally	 emerge	 as	 formal	NAMAs’,	 they	 flagged	 the	missions	 that	 could	 probably	 be	 turned	 into	 NAMAs	 (ABPS Infra, 2011: 56–57).	Although	 mitigation	 actions	 in	 India	 have	 not	 been	 formally	 recognized	 as	NAMAs,	 an	Expert	Committee	on	NAMAs	seems	 to	be	 in	place	 (MoEFCC,	2015:	13).	At	the	moment,	the	only	NAMA	initiative	currently	underway	in	India	is	the	NAMA	 feasibility	 study	 on	waste	 and	 forestry	 sectors,	 being	 supported	 by	 the	GIZ.	 These	 sectors	 have	 been	 chosen	 by	 the	MoEFCC	 as	 India	 had	 contrasting	experience	 with	 these	 sectors	 under	 the	 CDM	 –	 small	 number	 of	 projects	 in	forestry	 viz-a-viz	 large	 number	 in	 waste	 sector	 (IN-03).	 In	 contrast	 all	 the	mitigation	actions	 in	Brazil	have	been	 “informed	 to	 the	Convention”	as	NAMAs	(MCTI,	 2014:	 14).	 This	 is	 in	 continuation	 of	 the	 developments	 at	 the	 agenda	setting	 stage.	 In	 total,	 eight	 actions	 have	 been	 described	 as	 NAMAs.	 The	“momentum	 in	 2009-2010,	 in	 favour	 of	 approving	 the	 climate	 change	 law”	(BR04)	that	resulted	 in	 formulation	of	 the	policy	 is	also	 identified	as	 the	 factor	responsible	for	this	development.		Unlike	the	somewhat	binary	approach	to	NAMAs	taken	in	India	and	Brazil,	South	Africa	 presents	 a	much	more	 complex	 picture.	 Respondents	 find	 debate	 about	terminology	distracting	(SA-03,	10,	17)	and	complained	that	negotiators	tend	to	act	as	 “basket	of	kittens	 […	getting]	excited	about	 the	next	new	shiny	object	 in	the	 sky”	 (SA-17)	 thus	 making	 it	 difficult	 for	 non-state	 actors	 to	 develop	 a	concept.	 Nonetheless,	 both	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 undertook	 initiatives	 to	showcase	some	of	South	Africa’s	mitigation	actions	as	NAMAs,	SARi,	SSF	and	V-NAMAs	being	the	prominent	ones.	In	some	sense	it	is	both	a	reflection	of	highly	consultative	nature	of	climate	policy	formulation	process	in	South	Africa	as	well	as	limited	capability	of	the	driving	agency	to	define	and	own	the	policy	process.	Nonetheless,	NAMA	terminology	was	not	used	in	the	NCCRWP	as	implications	of	its	usage	were	not	clear	at	the	time	(SA-04,	08).	But	it	seems	that	efforts	to	align	NAMA	 initiatives	 with	 the	 national	 flagships	 programme	 are	 still	 underway	(DEA,	2014b,	Chapter	7	Additional	Information).	Thus	lack	of	clarity	on	NAMAs,	results	in	very	different	modes	of	NAMA	policy	formulation	in	IBSA	countries.	
5.3 Decision-Making	Whether	 to	 use	 the	 NAMA	 terminology	 to	 describe	 mitigation	 action	 or	 not	seems	 to	 be	 a	 strategic	 choice,	 particularly	 influenced	 by	 country’s	 approach	towards	 international	 support	 and	 commensurate	 MRV	 requirements.	 On	 one	end	 of	 the	 scale	 is	 Brazil	 for	 whom	 NAMA	 engagement	 is	 natural	 because	 it	doesn’t	“see	NAMAs	as	action	to	get	support.	NAMA	is	our	commitment”	(BR-06).	Thus	 it	 sees	 no	 distinction	 between	 its	 mitigation	 actions	 and	 NAMAs	 (MCTI,	
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2014),	 as	 making	 distinctions	 between	 supported	 and	 unsupported	 actions	 is	considered	“a	nightmare”	as	 it	 is	 time-consuming	“to	actually	demonstrate	 that	this	support	is	actually	for	implementing	something	that	is	plus	something	that	you	 are	 actually	 proposing”	 (BR06).	 This	 approach	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	 Brazil’s	iNDC	 whose	 implementation	 “is	 not	 contingent	 upon	 international	 support”	(Government	of	Brazil,	2015,	p.	3).		For	 South	 Africa	 NAMA	 exemplifies	 the	 confusion	 that	 has	 also	 muddled	 its	implementation	 efforts.	 The	 conditionality	 clause	 in	 its	 Copenhagen	 pledges	 is	seen	as	“an	inhibition	to	national	action	[…because]	if	we	do	stuff	before	we	have	to,	then	we	undermine	our	own	case	for	getting	[…]	the	international	support	[…	and]	having	those	commitment	is	as	much	a	barrier	as	it	is	an	enabler	because	it	is	 conditional	 commitment”	 (SA-08).	 This	 combined	 with	 lack	 of	 clarity	 on	IMCCC’s	 role	 as	 the	 institutional	 body	 providing	 oversight	 for	 implementation	has	 resulted	 in	 an	 uneven	 engagement	 with	 NAMAs	 across	 various	 actors	 in	South	Africa,	currently	operating	without	any	overall	guidance.	At	the	other	end	of	 the	 scale,	 lack	 of	 clarity	 on	 “international	 support	 for	 NAMAs	 has	 clearly	influenced	India’s	attitude”	(IN-10).	While	“both	the	magnitude	and	the	level	at	which	(support)	will	come”	are	 important	 factors	for	India,	 it	 is	 felt	 that	clarity	on	 “where	 from,	 what	 kind	 of	 domestic	 actions	 […]	 will	 be	 eligible	 for	international	 support”	 (IN-03)	 is	 needed	 before	 taking	 on	NAMAs.	 India	 seeks	support	 to	 ensure	 successful	 implementation	 of	 its	 INDC	 under	 Articles	 of	 the	Convention	(India,	2015).	Therefore,	it	is	evident	that	lack	of	clarity	on	support	evokes	three	very	different	type	of	responses	from	the	case	countries.	
5.4 Implementation	Gap	 between	 policy	 and	 actual	 implementation	 is	 a	 common	 refrain	 running	across	IBSA,	though	it	is	much	more	prominent	in	South	Africa.	Lack	of	clarity	on	the	 role	 of	 IMCCC,	makes	 coordination	 of	 its	 initiatives	 difficult	 (Worthington,	2014,	p.	18).	In	addition	the	Minister	of	Finance	was	also	not	part	of	the	IMCCC	
(Giordano et al., 2011: 18–19).	At	 this	point	 in	 time,	we	cannot	 infer	 the	extent	 to	which	this	factor	impacted	the	implementation.	In	contrast,	almost	all	the	major	ministries	were	on	board	 in	Brazil’s	CIM	and	GEx.	Attempts	were	also	made	to	label	 specific	 initiatives	 in	 South	 Africa	 as	 NAMAs	 –	 something	 that	 is	 not	witnessed	in	the	other	two	case	countries	–	these	attempts	have	not	necessarily	resulted	 in	 actual	 implementation	 on	 ground,	 primarily	 because	 of	 lack	 of	oversight	and	coordination.	While	 India	does	not	have	any	 specific	NAMAs	 in	place,	 the	performance	of	 its	national	missions	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 importance	 that	 the	 relevant	 line	ministries	give	 to	 the	 national	 missions.	 Existing	 level	 of	 staff	 seem	 insufficient	 for	implementing	 range	 of	 functions	 under	 various	 missions	 (Dubash	 &	 Joseph,	2015).	 For	NAMA	 implementation	 in	 India,	 lack	 of	 clarity	 on	 available	 support	comes	across	as	an	immediate	factor.	Barring	aside	a	feasibility	study,	mitigation	actions	 in	 India	 are	 not	 referred	 to	 as	 NAMAs.	 The	 Indian	 Govt.	 however	 has	engaged	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 INDCs	 more	 openly	 and	 invited	 different	stakeholders	for	their	views,	albeit	in	an	ad-hoc	manner.		
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In	 contrast,	 Brazil	 sees	 all	 of	 its	 actions	 as	 NAMAs	 (MCTI,	 2014)	 primarily	because	 it	 does	 not	 make	 them	 conditional	 to	 international	 support.	 While	avoiding	 deforestation	 efforts	 have	 been	 highly	 successful,	 other	 NAMAs	 have	not	been	that	successful.	While	Amazon	NAMA	has	reduced	emissions,	 it	 is	not	“promoting	 low-carbon	 development”	 (BR-04)	 per	 se.	 This	 is	 an	 important	observation	 as	 it	 implies	 that	 successful	 implementation	 of	 NAMA	 need	 not	result	 in	 cleaner	 energy	mix	 if	 other	 contextual	 developments	 are	 in	 opposing	direction.	Nonetheless	Brazil	has	also	moved	beyond	NAMAs	to	INDCs,	thus	the	future	of	NAMA	as	a	concept	is	doubtful.	It	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 while	 NAMA	 has	 been	 considered	 as	 a	 policy	 option	 in	different	degrees	in	IBSA,	at	the	moment,	all	three	countries	have	moved	beyond	NAMAs	 to	 INDC.	 Although	 Brazil	 presented	 its	 mitigation	 actions	 as	 NAMAs,	none	 of	 the	 initiatives	 have	 specifically	 been	 successfully	 promoted	 purely	 as	NAMA.	 This	 shows	 that	 efforts	 of	 countries	 “to	 shoehorn	 their	 stuff	 into	 an	international	term	that	is	just	an	empty	shell”	(SA-13)	had	limited	success.	This	observation	 is	 in	 line	with	 Tyler	 et	 al.	 (2013)	who	 concluded	 that	 NAMA	 as	 a	concept	 seems	 to	 be	 “positively	 impacting	 mitigation	 action	 in	 the	 smaller	developing	countries	…	but	not	in	India,	South	Africa	or	Brazil.”	
5.5 Evaluation	Evaluation	 features	 prominently	 as	 a	 relevant	 factor	 for	 the	 policy	 process	 on	NAMAs	 in	 all	 IBSA	 countries,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 expectations	 on	 international	provisions	 for	 MRVing	 NAMAs	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 evaluating	 the	 countries’	experience	with	NAMAs.		Even	if	implementation	of	NAMAs	has	not	happened	in	India	and	South	Africa	–	given	the	current	understanding	of	NAMAs	in	these	countries	–	expectations	on	international	 MRV	 requirements	 has	 been	 an	 inhibiting	 factor	 for	 embracing	NAMAs,	particularly	in	India.	This	led	to	a	distancing	of	their	domestic	mitigation	actions	from	the	concept	of	NAMAs.	And	it	was	presented	as	a	case	for	the	need	to	update	policy.		The	story	is	different	for	Brazil.	In	Brazil,	the	view	that	the	Copenhagen	Pledge	is	a	NAMA	never	faded,	as	was	the	case	in	India.	Therefore,	central	actors	in	Brazil	can	maintain	the	position	that	NAMAs	have	both	been	decided	on	and	are	under	implementation.	 Here,	 evaluation	 of	 implementation	 has	 been	 a	 strong	foundation	both	 for	detecting	problems	with	how	emissions	are	measured	and	for	 arguing	 for	 the	 need	 to	 update	 policy	 around	both	 reporting	 practices	 and	targets.		
5.6 Policy	innovation	In	all	three	IBSA	countries,	the	experience	with	NAMAs	informed	the	process	of	designing	 new	 policy	 in	 shape	 of	 INDCs.	 The	 policy	 process	 around	NAMAs	 is	highlighted,	particularly	in	Brazil	and	India,	as	an	important	learning	process	for	how	 domestic	 climate	 policy	 relates	 to	 international	 climate	 policy.	 The	 South	African	 INDC	 also	 quite	 clearly	 builds	 on	what	 the	Government,	 in	 their	 INDC,	
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explicitly	 refer	 to	 as	 their	 Cancún	 Pledge,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 submission	 in	 2009	referred	to	as	their	NAMA.	In	 both	 Brazil	 and	 South	 Africa,	 several	 of	 the	 informants	 and	 the	 official	documents	 speak	 the	 same	 language:	 that	 the	 INDCs	 have	 moved	 on	 from	NAMAs	by	updating	the	national	target	from	a	deviation	from	business	as	usual	(which	was	 the	 encouraged	 framing	 of	 NAMAs	 agreed	 by	 the	 UNFCCC	 COP	 in	Cancún	2010)	to	absolute	emission	reduction	targets.	As	an	example,	the	South	African	 INDC	 explicitly	 relates	 to	 South	 Africa’s	 previous	 Cancún	 Pledge	 by	specifying	 a	 timeframe	 for	 evaluating	 the	 implementation	of	 the	NAMA	 (2016-2020)	 and	by	 expressing	 the	 target	 of	 the	Cancún	Pledge	 for	 the	period	2021-2025	in	absolute	terms	rather	than	as	a	deviation	from	BAU.	In	fact,	the	Cancún	Pledge	 and	 the	 INDC	are	 in	 several	 respects	 identical,	 for	 example	 in	outlining	that	“This	 level	of	effort	will	enable	South	Africa’s	greenhouse	gas	emissions	to	peak	between	2020	and	2025,	plateau	for	approximately	a	decade	and	decline	in	absolute	terms	thereafter”	(Ref	to	Cancún	Pledge,	p.	2	and	INDC,	p.	6).	In	case	of	India	 though	 NAMAs	 have	 not	 been	 instrumental	 for	 policy	 innovation.	 On	 a	conceptual	 level	 though,	 work	 done	 by	 TERI7	created	 important	 space	 for	deliberating	 upon	 the	 purpose	 and	 utility	 of	 NAMA,	 while	 suggesting	 a	 way	forward	to	facilitate	decision	making	(Shrivastava	et	al.,	2013).	This	has	not	yet	been	linked	to	implementation.	In	 general,	 the	 INDCs	 are	 seen	 as	 updates	 of	 pledges	 put	 forward	 in	 the	countries’	 submissions	 under	 the	 Copenhagen	 Accord	 in	 2009	 and	 Cancún	Agreements	 in	 2009.	 All	 three	 countries	 are	 engaging	 differently	 with	 the	concept	of	INDCs,	largely	following	in	the	backwaters	of	how	they	have	engaged	also	 with	 NAMAs.	 Table	 2	 below	 summarizes	 the	 informants	 views	 on	 NAMA	engagement	in	IBSA	countries	at	different	stages	of	policy	cycle.		
																																																								7	For	more	details	refer	to:	http://www.teriin.org/projects/nfa/cc2bwp1.php	
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6 Conclusions	While	 IBSA	 countries	 have	 not	 submitted	 any	 formal	 NAMA	 proposal	 to	 the	NAMA	registry,	this	does	not	imply	absence	of	domestic	NAMA	engagement.	As	is	evident	from	our	analysis,	NAMA	engagement	has	played	out	very	differently	in	the	three	countries	and	is	closely	associated	with	the	domestic	priorities.		On	one	end	of	 the	scale	 is	Brazil	which	seamlessly	merged	 its	domestic	actions	into	 the	 UNFCCC	 formulation	 of	 NAMAs.	 Framing	 its	 mitigation	 actions	 as	 its	commitments	 under	 NAMA,	 Brazil	 delinked	 its	 domestic	 initiatives	 from	international	 support.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 implementation	 of	 its	 various	NAMAs	is	not	uniform.	And	even	the	success	of	its	Amazon	NAMA,	is	not	enough	to	 drive	 it	 towards	 a	 low-carbon	 development	 path.	How	NAMA	played	 out	 in	Brazil	is	in	stark	contrast	with	India’s	experience.	India	presents	a	vast	array	of	mitigation	actions	which	have	recently	been	jacked	up,	sending	the	signal	that	it	is	willing	 to	 take	 on	 a	 bigger	 role	 on	 climate	mitigation.	 Yet	 it	 has	 steadfastly	maintained	aversion	for	using	internationally	formulated	constructs	to	define	its	
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domestic	actions.	Much	of	 its	reluctance	comes	from	its	desire	to	emphasize	its	sovereignty	in	domestic	affairs	and	deep	suspicion	of	current	climate	governance	architecture	 to	 deliver	 on	 its	 promises	 to	 provide	 support	 to	 developing	countries.	 In	addition,	 the	 scale	of	 support	being	made	available	 is	not	 seen	as	worthwhile	 to	 indulge.	 South	 Africa	 falls	 somewhere	 in	 between	 these	 two	binaries.	 In	 its	 efforts	 to	 project	 itself	 as	 a	 responsible	 member	 of	 global	community	 is	 keen	 to	 take	 on	 international	 framing.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 vested	interests	and	its	 inability	to	translate	 laudable	policies	 into	realities	hamper	 its	engagement	 with	 NAMAs.	 Lack	 of	 oversight	 and	 turf	 battles	 over	 who	 should	drive	its	climate	and	energy	policies	has	muddied	the	waters	for	NAMAs,	and	has	impeded	 the	 implementation	of,	well	 designed	NAMAs.	This	 variance	 in	NAMA	engagement	will	provide	an	important	backdrop	for	implementing	INDCs.	Irrespective	of	 their	NAMA	experiences,	all	 three	countries	are	now	gearing	up	for	 translating	 their	 INDCs	 into	 NDCs.	 This	 is	 where	 studying	 their	 NAMA	engagement	 from	 a	 policy	 cycle	 perspective	 provides	 important	 findings	 for	internationally	formulated	concepts	that	are	to	be	engaged	in	different	domestic	settings.	All	the	three	cases	show	different	modes	of	engagement	with	NAMAs.		Firstly,	 their	 experiences	 varied	 at	 the	 agenda	 setting	 stage	 itself.	 As	 the	 India	example	shows,	NAMAs	were	not	considered	much	useful	and	could	not	go	much	beyond	 the	 agenda-setting	 stage.	 Agendas	 can	 only	 be	 influenced	 if	 these	concepts	are	able	to	address	existing	priorities.	In	Brazil	environment	was	seen	as	an	important	issue	in	electoral	process	and	mitigation	action	was	projected	as	NAMAs	 to	 tap	 this	 constituency.	 But	 in	 South	 African	 and	 India	 contexts	development	 and	 social	 goals	 trump	environmental	 concerns	 and	here	NAMAs	have	not	been	that	successful.	Second,	 maintaining	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 vagueness	 was	 often	 portrayed	 as	NAMA’s	strength.	But	as	is	visible	in	policy	formulation	stage,	implementers	find	it	hard	to	engage	with	such	a	high	degree	of	abstraction.	In	instances	where	all	mitigation	 actions	 are	 not	 considered	 equivalent	 to	 NAMAs,	 analytically	 more	concrete	framing	can	prove	helpful.	Third,	 decision-making	 stage	 is	 influenced	 by	 what	 can	 NAMAs	 deliver.	 For	Brazil,	making	distinction	between	supported	and	unsupported	actions	was	seen	as	 a	 waste	 of	 time	 and	 therefore	 it	 decided	 to	 label	 its	 mitigation	 actions	 as	NAMAs	without	waiting	for	clarity	on	support.	In	contrast,	both	India	and	South	Africa	 are	 dependent	 on	 fossil	 fuels	 for	meeting	 their	 energy	 requirements.	 In	order	 for	 them	 to	 break	 their	 institutional	 lock-in,	 clarity	 on	 international	support	is	necessary.	While	nations	have	already	formally	submitted	their	INDCs,	if	 the	global	community	 is	serious	about	scaling	up	these	commitments,	 then	 it	needs	to	provide	greater	clarity	on	support.	Without	it	countries	cannot	wean	off	their	fossil	fuel	dependence.		Fourth,	 while	 implementation	 is	 very	 much	 dependent	 on	 the	 domestic	institutional	 capacity,	 if	 international	 framings	 are	 not	 seen	 as	 providing	 any	value-addition	 to	 existing	 interventions,	 then	 they	 will	 not	 be	 utilised.	 In	addition,	successful	implementation	of	NAMAs	by	themselves,	need	not	result	in	low-carbon	development	–	as	 is	evident	by	 the	Amazon	NAMA	 in	Brazil.	Policy	
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analysts	 need	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 broader	 context	 to	 understand	 effectiveness	 of	policy	interventions.	Packaging	actions	as	NAMAs	or	not	is	secondary	to	actually	making	 implementable	 policies	 that	 promote	 low-carbon	 development	 as	 a	whole.	Fifth,	 global	 climate	 governance	 architecture	 continues	 to	 suffer	 from	 trust	deficit	due	 to	 its	perceived	 insensitivity	 towards	addressing	needs	of	emerging	economies.	 Countries	 prefer	 to	 use	 their	 own	 frameworks	 to	 evaluate	 their	actions.	 Having	 lack	 of	 clarity	 on	 support	makes	 countries	 even	more	wary	 of	international	MRV	requirements.	Finally,	it	may	be	possible	to	have	high	policy	innovation	capacity	without	having	effective	 implementation.	 In	addition,	 lots	of	 instances	of	policy	 innovation	are	continuation	 of	 existing	 paradigms.	 While	 INDCs	 reflect	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	policy	instruments	on	policy	horizon,	they	do	not	reflect	radical	change	in	policy	paradigm.		Current	 experiments	 with	 policy	 instruments	 reflect	 normal	 policy	 making	marked	 by	 second	 order	 changes	 (Hall,	 1993).	 The	 developments	 at	 domestic	level	 are	 only	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 incremental	 gains	 approach	 currently	 playing	out	 at	 UNFCCC	 level	where	 one	 policy	 instrument	 is	 replaced	 by	 a	 new	policy	instrument	 that	 follows	 in	 the	 foot	 step	of	 the	previous.	Policy	process	 studies	need	 not	 be	 distracted	 by	 mutations	 of	 concepts	 and	 terminologies.	 Still,	 the	gains	of	the	IBSA	countries	having	grappled	with	NAMAs	may	prove	valuable	in	the	INDC	process.	Their	respective	NAMA	encounters	have	helped	to	clarify	the	element	of	national	appropriateness	on	a	conceptual	level,	in	particularly	at	the	agenda	setting,	but	also	partly	 in	policy	 formulation.	While	 this	may	have	been	helpful	 in	 building	 capacity,	 going	 beyond	 these	 stages	 need	 global	 climate	governance	to	get	its	act	together.	
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